Mapping China’s Strategic Port Development in Africa

African debates on Chinese-built or operated port infrastructure tend to focus on the impact on advancing economic output. 

These discussions rarely address the sovereignty or security dimensions of these port developments.

Chinese state-owned firms are active stakeholders in an estimated 78 ports across 32 African countries as builders, financiers, or operators. Chinese port developments are concentrated in West Africa, with 35 compared to 17 in East Africa, 15 in Southern Africa, and 11 in North Africa.

With a total of 231 commercial ports in Africa, Chinese firms are present in over a quarter of Africa’s maritime trade hubs. This is a significantly greater presence than anywhere else in the world. By comparison, Latin America and the Caribbean host 10 Chinese-built or operated ports, while Asian countries host 24.

Chinese firms are present in over a quarter of Africa’s maritime trade hubs—a greater presence than anywhere else in the world.

In some sites, Chinese firms dominate the entire port development enterprise from finance to construction, operations, and share ownership. Large conglomerates like China Communications Construction Corporation (CCCC) will win work as prime contractors and hand out sub-contracts to subsidiaries like the China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC). This is the case in one of West Africa’s busiest ports, Nigeria’s Lekki Deep Sea Port. CHEC did the construction and engineering, secured loan financing from the China Development Bank (CDB), and took a 54-percent financial stake in the port which it operates on a 16-year lease.

China gains as much as $13 in trade revenues for every $1 invested in ports. A firm holding an operating lease or concession agreement reaps not only the financial benefits of all trade passing through that port but can also control access. The operator determines the allocation of piers, accepts or denies port calls, and can offer preferential rates and services for its nation’s vessels and cargo. Control over port operations by an external actor, accordingly, raises obvious sovereignty and security concerns. This is why some countries forbid foreign port operators on national security grounds.

Chinese firms hold operating concessions in 10 African ports. Despite the risks over loss of control, the trend on the continent is toward privatizing port operations for improved efficiency. Delays and poor management of African ports are estimated to raise handling costs by 50 percent over global rates.

Another concern of China’s expansive port development in Africa is the possibility of repurposing commercial ports for military activities. China’s development of Djibouti’s Doraleh Port, long marketed as a purely commercial venture, was extended to accommodate a naval facility in 2017. It, thus, became China’s first known overseas military base 2 months after the main port was opened. There is widespread speculation that China could replicate this model for future basing arrangements elsewhere on the continent.

This raises concerns about China’s broader geostrategic aims with its port development and stokes Africans’ widely held aversion to being pulled into geostrategic rivalries. There is also a growing wariness against hosting more foreign bases in Africa. This underscores the mounting African and international interest in scrutinizing China’s port development—and dual-use military basing—scenarios.